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Abstract 
 
Many scholars believe that every religion has its peaceful interpretation as well as violent practices. Yet, this article 
elaborates more on the Islamic radical movements in Indonesia, particularly on the questions of what factors have 
triggered them to conduct such violence, how they linked each other and what action should be taken by the Indonesian 
government to counter-terrorism. To answer the question, the paper will focus on the ideology part and organization 
network of Darul Islam (DI) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which shared similar ideology, network and methods of 
recruitment. Authors argue that ideology and organization become vital elements for DI and JI, in which the 
government, coupled with all stakeholders, should pay more attention if they want to eradicate violence in the name 
of religion. Although there is “no prescription fits all” in eradicating terrorism, the ability to understand the root 
causes and organization network of terrorism in Indonesia will help the government and all stakeholders to establish 
a proper strategy. 
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Abstrak 
 
Banyak pengamat percaya bahwa setiap agama mengandung interpretasi damai sekaligus juga tindak kekerasan. 
Namun, artikel ini akan mengulas lebih banyak tentang gerakan radikal Islam di Indonesia, terutama yang terkait 
dengan faktor-faktor apa saja yang mendorong mereka melakukan aksi kekerasan, bagaimana kelompok-kelompok 
tersebut saling memiliki keterkaitan dan tindakan apa yang perlu diambil oleh pemerintah Indonesia dalam melakukan 
kontra-terorisme. Untuk menjawab pertanyaan tersebut, paper ini akan menjelaskan ideologi dan jaringan organisasi 
dari Darul Islam (DI) dan Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), di mana keduanya memiliki kemiripan termasuk juga dalam metode 
rekrutmen. Penulis berpendapat bahwa ideologi dan organisasi merupakan elemen penting bagi DI dan JI. Oleh karena 
itu, pemerintah dan seluruh elemen masyarakat harus memperhatikan hal ini jika ingin memberantas kekerasan atas 
nama agama. Walaupun tidak ada “resep ampuh” yang dapat mengatasi terorisme, kemampuan untuk memahami akar 
permasalahan dan jaringan organisasi kelompok terorisme di Indonesia akan membantu pemerintah dan seluruh 
elemen masyarakat untuk menyusun strategi yang tepat.  
 
Kata Kunci: Counter-terrorism, salafi jihadisme, Darul Islam, Jemaah Islamiyah 
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1. Introduction 
 
Sociologists believe that all religions have two faces, just like two sides of coins. The first face 
is that justifies the peaceful, harmony, tolerant interpretation and the second one is the one that 
support violent interpretation. Following the idea that religions can be a message of violence, there 
have been number of examples when militant across religious followers have used theology of 
violence to legitimize their violent actions.  
Every religion has this nature. In Islam, ‘jihad’ despite its multi interpretative meanings, has 
been interpreted for violence. Literally, the word ‘jihad’ means ‘to struggle or to persevere.’ 
(Bonner, 2006) Al Quran itself seldom uses the term ‘jihad’ as warfare. Primarily, Quran relates 
this word with the notion of “jihad fil sabil Allah,” which means that Moslems should strive in a 
way to serve merely the purpose of God, perform their devotion to Allah and please Him per se. 
(Heck, 2004) However, the violence carried out by Salafi Jihadists, such as members of Al Qaeda 
and its affiliates in the world, lead many people to misinterpret and relate the idea with violence in 
the name of Islam. 
Christian leaders have also promoted hard line action and violence as the manifestation of 
liberation theology to uplift their underdeveloped followers. The Catholic Bishop Meeting in Rome 
in 1971 hailed action on behalf of justice and liberation of people from every oppression. The 
French Priest Rene Laurentin observed the following year that “violence has taken on considerable 
importance to days as a means of exorcising the underdevelopment” (Appleby, 2000). The Hindus 
groups used “Hindutva (Hindu-ness) to reconstruct their religion teaching around their nationalist 
theme to reject to the secular, pluralistic states and would replace it with Hinduized states. Their 
robust objection was clearly seen through attacks towards Christians, Moslems and their worship 
places in India. Just like the instrumentalization of jihad to replace pluralistic state with Islamic 
state. The religious followers who believe in violent ways manipulate theological interpretation to 
legitimize their purpose.  
Terror as an action is resulted in militant thoughts and attitude. If collectively shared, they will 
form militant movements. In Islamic society, theoretical explanation of the roots of the militant 
movements can be summarized at least into two aspects: First, internal aspects, which relates the 
narrow interpretation of religious dogma, that is the degree of openness in interpreting religious 
teachings and dogma. No matter the interpretation is correct or wrong, such narrow interpretation 
then serves as an ideology of the movement. The second is the perception of external factor that is 
the feeling of being marginalized and unjustly treated in economics, politics and social life such as 
education. The media, which broadcast the poor condition of Moslem in politics, economy and 
social life has played important role in forming that feeling.   
This paper focuses more on the ideology and the dynamics of the organization network of Darul 
Islam (DI) and Jema’ah Islamiyah (JI) in Indonesia. The two important elements in understanding 
the nature of their ideology that justifies the action while organization directly or indirectly 
provides support with logistics and infrastructures. Mark Juergensmeyer (2001) has elaborated 
much on the role of organization backing up religion-inspired terrorists. Behind the killer of Yitzak 
Rabin, Yigal Amir, there is a big Zionist movements operating inside and outside Israel. Behind 
Timothy Mc Veigh, and Buford Furrow, the bomber of Bulding of Jews Reservation, there was a 
branch of militant Christians who grows very rapidly in the US. In Muslim society, the sniper of 
Anwar Sadat, Khaled Islambouli was a militant member of segregated Ikhwanul Muslimin known 
as Takfir wal Hijra.  
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2. Root Causes of Terrorism 
 
There is a polarized debate about the underlying causes of violent extremism in Islamic world. 
In one hand, analysts believe some people become radicals as they are influenced by the external 
situation such as discrimination, injustice, oppression, and other violence towards them or their 
group, which has led them to become terrorists. Therefore the struggle against terrorism should 
prioritize on social and economic development as well as educational empowerment, since poverty 
and grievance often provide a fertile land for extremism. Other analysts examine the internal factors 
and question the nexus between socio economic problems and extremism. They argue that many 
terrorists are neither poor nor uneducated. They are convinced that narrow-minded jihadist 
ideology and internal psychological aspects serve as the root causes. 
Other researches like Kumar Ramakrishna (2009) analyze more variables to explain violent 
behavior of certain people as he noticed that not all discriminated and suppressed people, nor 
pesantren (Islamic school) students became terrorists.  He concluded that it is not a single factor 
that attracts people to become terrorists and radicals. Instead, it is a product of interaction between 
existential identity, culture and a complex set of individual personality variables. The variables 
involved the structural factors such as geopolitical developments, local historical forces, ideology, 
and the small group context that comprise the environmental ‘situation’ that created individual 
personality. The combination between internal and external factors created what so-called the 
“situated individual personality.” Departing form this combination, there are at least three theories 
to explain the root causes of terrorism in Indonesia: 
a. Perceived injustice and socio-economic grievances: Most terrorists have been 
discriminated and are victimized by of prejudice, injustice or violence both in the 
workplace and in society. Accordingly, they want retaliation. Some terrorist masterminds 
work on these frustrations and manipulate their followers’ minds using religious and 
communal arguments. Approximately 23 percent of Indonesian youths are unemployed, 
which is far above the national average of 7 percent. (Christian Science Monitor, 2011) 
The unemployment rate leads to social and economic frustrations. Many militant groups 
then search the solution by offering the radical change of the current secular state into the 
Islamic state. Their offer sought to appeal the increasingly disenfranchised youths who 
believe Indonesia’s secular government has failed them.  
b.  Bonding between friends and family:  Marc Sageman (2004), a forensic psychiatrist and 
former Central Intelligence Agency officer in Afghanistan, found that 88 percent terrorists 
chose their violent action not because they wanted to change the world but because they 
had friendship as well as family bonds to jihadists. Sixty-eight percent either had 
preexisting friendships with people that were already in the group or part of the group who 
collectively joined the group. This is typical of the Hamburg group that conducted the 
9/11 attacks. Another 20 percent had close family bonds to jihadists.  
c. Ignorance and lack of knowledge about Islam: One main point why people may become 
radicalized and turned into terrorists is that they neglect the true nature of Islam. 
Interestingly, terrorists who claim to be motivated by religious ideology are often ignorant 
about Islam. In fact many of the participants in rehabilitation program did not have much 
formal education or proper religious instruction and had only a limited and incomplete 
understanding of Islam teachings. (Christian Science Monitor, 2011) 
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3. The Role of Ideology 
 
The term of ideology here refers to how one or group view the world that surrounds them. 
Ideology becomes the major element for a group to achieve their goals and conduct their actions, 
including the using of violence. In this regard, religion can be the subject or the object of violence 
behavior. As the subject, religions such as Jews, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism, 
often justify the using of intimidations and violence towards their followers in order to reach their 
target. Any religion also provides terrorist groups with motivation, structure and means of struggle. 
(Juergensmeyer, 2000) 
The current radical ideology interpreted from the Islamic teaching has drawn attention 
particularly since the 9/11 attacks. The teaching itself is derived from Sayyid Qutb idea in which 
the terrorist-members claimed themselves more as the protectors of the coming Islamic revolution. 
Their main goal is to restore a Caliphate system which sets out the determination of Islamic Sharia 
and ensures it operates along its guidelines (Stout, 2009) To establish such system, Qutb allows 
every jahiliyyah, which is defined as states that rejects God’s authority and Islamic rules, to be 
fought and overthrown with extreme measures (Shepard, 2003). This idea obviously provides 
justification for the toppling of all world governments that fits the jahiliyyah category by a global 
war, including states governed by Moslems. (Zimmerman, 2004) 
The ideology of the terrorist is the way they view the world that surround them, more 
specifically that directly influence the life of Moslems nationally and internationally. From 
international dimension, the terrorists view that the position of the West led by the US in the Middle 
East conflict between Israel and Palestine as being one sided in favor of Israel. This policy has also 
been exacerbated by the US attack to Afghanistan and Iraq. They are even sure that the next target 
will be either Iran or Syria. In this point of view, non-Muslims, which see as similar to the West, 
will never be happy with the resurgence of Islam. (Huntington, 1993) 
From the national dimension, the ideology of terrorist can be traced from Abdullah Sungkar 
teachings. He asserted that Islam never teaches nationalism, so that there is no Indonesian country 
in Islamic concept. He perceived that the universe, where Indonesia is in belongs to Allah. He also 
argues that the naming of Indonesia was a coincidence as this country is located between Melanesia 
and India. Nationalism destroys the theological concept of Muslims. In line with this, Abdullah 
Sungkar rejected all national symbols like National flag and national anthem. Instead, he was in 
favor of Islamic Caliphate system, that is a universal, transnational state, established on the spirit 
of Islamic brotherhood and tawhid. He argued that when Caliphate system - the lost political 
concept in Islam - is established, Islam becomes a respected religion. (Nursalim, 2001) 
The first preparation step to make this idea comes true is by establishing Islamic states in each 
Islamic countries. When the time comes, such countries will be united under the caliphate 
confederation (Nursalim, 2001). Jema’ah Islamiyah’s activists, who sought to establish Daulah 
Nusantara, strongly believe this idea. A Caliphate confederation is planned to embrace Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, South of Thailand and South Philippines.  The idea of Caliphate implicitly 
calls for the implementation of Shariah law in all Moslem countries. Consequently, terrorists will 
view any regime in Indonesia who doesn’t officially formalize Islamic states will be considered as 
“infidel government” which deserve rebel. Interestingly, contemporary Islamic paramilitary groups 
like Laskar Jihad and Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender Front) doubted such ideology. 
Instead, these two paramilitaries are less ideological although they are more “attractive” and are 
easier to dissolve as has happened to Laskar Jihad.    
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4. The Organization Network 
 
Many observers believe that contemporary terrorists in Indonesia are developed from JI 
network.  Such belief is fifty percent true and fifty percent not. JI is a new regional network. The 
fact is that the history of terror in Indonesia long predates to the existence of JI. It can be learnt 
from the history of Darul Islam (DI) whose embryo can be traced back to the history of 
Independence War. During that time Muslim fighters established paramilitary Hizbullah (soldiers 
of Allah). Hizbullah together with other Dutch trained soldiers and Japanese trained soldiers were 
then united in the national army (ABRI). 
Despite its defeat, DI movements existed in all political regimes in Indonesia. Until to day the 
movement has come to its fifth generations. The first generation was the founder of DI who rebelled 
the national government and was aimed at establishing Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam 
Indonesia or NII), the militant activist calls it as N eleven (N sebelas/N11). The leader of the first 
generation was the late Sekarmaji Marijan Kartosuwiryo. This group was disappointed with the 
Renvile agreement and the failure of Islamic leaders in having Islam as the ideology of the state 
and inserting “Djakarta Charter” in the constitution. The charter is later known as the seven words 
“with the obligation for Moslems to practice their shariah.” This movement then inspired other 
two Islamic movements: DI of South of Sulawesi led by Kahar Muzakkar and DI of Aceh led by 
Daud Beureuh. The motive behind the DI rebellion movement in Aceh was slight different. They 
felt being betrayed by Jakarta government, which integrated Aceh in the North Sumatra province. 
The second generation started in the aftermath of the defeat of Kartosuwiryo who was then 
sentenced to death in 1962.  This period is called “the head down period” or silence period. The 
strategy responded the defeat of the movement. In this generation there was no significant 
movements emerged. The leader of the second generation was Adah Djaelani. The third generation 
started in line with the dynamics of cold war. The rise of the third generation was motivated by the 
rise of communist in the South East Asia. The activist of the third generation was invited by elites 
from the intelligent body to activate the network with the official aim at dealing with the spread of 
communism threat. The leaders of the third generation were Haji Ismail Pranoto (HISPRAN) in 
Java and Gaos Taufik in Sumatra.  This period was called as consolidation period. During this 
period, terror tragedies recurred anywhere involving DI activists using the name of Komando Jihad 
(Jihad command). Among their actions were hijacking Garuda Airplane, known as Woyla tragedy 
and BCA and Borobudur temple Bombings. 
 During this time, the recruitment of members was developed through Usroh method, an 
exclusive sermon system developed by Ikhwanul Muslimin in Egypt. In this method around five 
participants received Islamic teaching but were then continued to “militanization training”. It was 
then uncovered, that this generation was instrumentalized by political elites targeting at discrediting 
Islam. DI members believed that the government at that time was planning to enforce mono-
ideology (Azaz Tunggal), Pancasila for all political and social organizations. In this period, Ngruki 
Boarding School in Solo was established by HISPRAN, Abdullah Sungkar dan Abu Bakar Baashir. 
This record shows that terror involving DI activists long predated the existence of JI.  It was also 
proved that the tragedy was not simply criminal, nor simply religion-motivated terrors. There was 
a political plot behind it. 
The fourth generation started after DI activists were aware that their network had been used for 
political purposes. DI movements then split into factions: (1) Atjeng Kurnia faction covering 
Bogor, Serang, Purwakarta, and Subang; (2) Ajengan Masduki faction covering Cianjur, 
Purwokerto, Subang, Jakarta, and Lampung; (3) Abdul Fatah Wiranagapati faction covering Garut, 
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Bandung, Surabaya, and Kalimantan; (4) Gaos Taufik faction, covering Sumatera; (5) Abdullah 
Sungkar faction, covering Jawa Tengah and Yogyakarta; (6) Ali Hate faction, covering Sulawesi 
Selatan; and (7) Area XI Comandement led by Abu Toto Syekh Panji Gumilang.  
The prominent leader in this period was Abdullah Sungkar and then was replaced by Abu Bakar 
Ba’ashir. The two leaders were sent for political tribunal in Sukorahardjo, Central Java, allegedly 
conducted subversion. However before the verdict, they fled to Malaysia and developed the dakwa 
movement there. During his exile, thousands of DI activists were sent to Malaysia and Afghanistan 
to support Moslem Afghani fighting against former Soviet occupation. Some of them also went to 
the South of Mindanao to support MILF fighting against central government of the Philippines. In 
Afghanistan, they joined other fellow Moslems from Malaysia, South of Philippines, South of 
Thailand, Pakistan and India. Here the activists’ understanding about ‘jihad’ was ultimately shifted 
into qital (war and violence), which rooted in Sayyid Qutb teaching.  
However, the idea of Salafi Jihadism triggered division within DI members. The leader of DI 
who was considered ‘abangan’, Ajengan Masduki and his followers rejected the idea and the 
practice of ‘jihad’ when Sungkar and his Afghanistan alumni proposed this as a means to coup the 
regime. A robust rejection of the idea forced Sungkar, Ba’asyir and their cadres to leave the 
organization. (Solahudin, 2011; Singh 2004) With the military skill they learnt from Afghanistan 
military camp, the DI fourth generation, along with their international fellow, established regional 
militant network later known as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). 
At the end of his tenure, Suharto changed his political strategy from exercising pressure to 
approach to Moslem community, which can be seen through his support to the establishment ICMI 
(Islamic Intellectual Association of Indonesia) and Shari’ah banks like Bank Muamalat. His policy 
later known as “politics of accommodation.” Nonetheless, the fourth generation of DI kept 
questioning the regime and persisted to be an underground movement. When the New Order 
Collapsed, DI activists still believed that there would be “another Suharto” who will enforce 
another repressive policies towards Islam.   
  Reformasi era shows different phenomena. The Law no. 2/1999 regarding Political Parties 
opens up an opportunity for freedom of association that led to mushrooming Islamic political 
parties. Of 48 political parties permitted to participate in the campaign, 15 were Islamic political 
parties. The most prominent ones are Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), Partai Keadilan (PK), 
which then changed its name into Partai Keadilan Sosial (PKS), Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN), 
and Partai Bulan Bintang and Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP). Some of the parties remain 
struggled to insert Djakarta Charter (piagam Djakarta) as one of their agendas.  
This political reality has opened up Islamic activists’ eyes and stimulated new hope; a hope that 
the future Indonesia will become better country for Indonesian Moslems. The new hopes have 
changed the strategy of some the leaders of the new generation from military to social.  They started 
to establish alliances with other Islamic groups who share the same missions in inserting Djakarta 
Charter to article 29 of the constitution. The concrete result of the alignment was the establishment 
of Majelis Mujahedin Indonesia (MMI). This confederation comprised of the fourth generation of 
DI who believe in the on-going political process united with some small Islamic groups from West 
Java, Sulawesi, Surabaya Solo and Madura, some Moslem intellectual like Abu Bakaar Baashir, 
Deliar Noor, Mochtar Naim and other some more ex-Masyumi activists. Within MMI there are 
also hardliner activists of DI who then connected to JI such as Agus Dwikarna, and Agung Hamid. 
Yet, due to rejection to its decision-making mechanism, Abu Bakaar Baashir, the Amirul 
Mujahidin of MMI, departed from MMI and established Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT). Although 
the US government has openly published JAT as terrorist organization, Indonesian government 
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remains suspended her statement about JAT. Despite her irresolute comment, many JAT members 
engaged in terrorist attacks between 2010 and 2013 such as Ahmad Yosefa Hayat (Pino 
Damaryanto), the suicide bomber at Gereja Bethel Injil Sepenuh (GBIS) Kepunton, Solo, Central 
Java, 2011.  
However, in some fields DI leaders remain believed in military strategy. They are based in three 
areas: West Java, Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, Bekasi and Central Java. The total numbers 
of activist with military skills are nearly 100.000.  Those who stayed abroad like Al Ghozi and 
Hambali never enjoyed such hope. Their mind had been covered by the phenomena of international 
politics reality, which they perceived as discredited more on Islam. The above split has transferred 
the leadership of DI from the fourth to the fifth generation. The main characteristic of this period 
is the absence of central leader like ABB. The leadership of the fifth generation was then spread 
over field leaders who no longer listen to and obey the leader of the fourth generation. The policy 
of the movements is fully under control of the field leaders.  
With the absence of central leadership, the fifth generation of DI had neither central command 
and nor central control. Some of those having military skills with “die hard’ orientation made 
contact with JI activists operating in Indonesia like Dr Azhari, Hambali and Nordin M Tops, Al 
Ghozi and then were recruited by JI. The term “die hard” here refers to the persistent attitude of 
the group which prior violent attack as the sole strategy to pursue their missions. Some Bali 
bombers, suicide bombers in Makasar, JW Marriot (Asmar Latinsani) and that in Kuningan (Herry 
Gholun and Rois) are those newly recruited militants. The complication of investigation on Dr 
Azhari, Nordin M Top, Zulkarnaen, the said new executive leader of JI after the arrest of Hambali 
can be analyzed from their connection with the hardliner faction of the fifth generation.  It is too 
early to conclude that the suicide bombers are members of JI.  The fact was that they are the activists 
of DI of the fifth generation. The faction who believes in social strategy initially confronted their 
actions as their actions destroy their strategy to formalize Shariah law through ongoing political 
process. 
 
5. JI’s Regional and Global Network  
 
As noted in Law No. 15/2003, Indonesian government categorizes terrorism as an organized 
and transnational crime with broad and global network.  JI, as the national terrorist network also 
establishes connection with other Islamic militant groups in South East Asia as well as 
international. Ideologically, tactically and financially, JI had connected with Al Qaeda (AQ) when 
previous JI’s cadres such as Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, Nasir Abas, Imron Baihaqi alias Musthopa, 
Thoriqudin, Muhaimin Yahya, Mukhlas, Mustaqim, M. Qital, Syawal, Mas Slamet Kastari and 
Hambali, joined military exercise in Afghanistan in 1990s. Hambali, JI’s leader in South East Asia, 
became prominent as he connected JI with AQ and succeeded to gather funding US$ 200,000 from 
AQ for JI’s operational in South East Asia region. 
In camps near Peshawar and in Afghanistan, all JI cadres met with Moslem militans from 
Islamic countries. Here, all radicals were not only militarily prepared but also religiously debriefed. 
They were trained with the capabilities of fighting, bombs assembling, military tactics and the 
understanding of fiqh, hadits as well as Quran interpretation. (Solahudin, 2011) Like religious 
schools, in the camp they were taught to return to the system following Islamic rules, politically 
and economically. Yet, all instructors emphasized ‘jihad,’ as a war, is the only means to achieve 
their goal - to establish Islamic Caliphate - and to overcome any obstacles. (Weelan, 2011) 
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To replicate the A–ghanistan training camp, Abdulla– Sungkar allegedly moved JI’s main 
military and religious training to a remote area in Mindanao. The aim was simply to train Islamic 
militant activists from South East Asia, preparing them with sufficient military capability and Salafi 
Jihadism ideology. With a good relationship with MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) leader, 
Salamat Hasyim, Sungkar established Hudaibiyah Camp near MILF’s complex. In this camp, 
Sungkar appointed Afghanistan’s alumni as instructors and many activists from JI, MILF, 
Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) got training from them. 
Some of Hudaibiyah students were Zulkifli, Sarwo Edi, Mustakim, Ubaid.  
In short, the Islamic militants encounter in both Afghanistan and Mindanao camp, gave 
opportunities for all cadres to share their experiences and grievances. Through these camps, AQ’s 
and JI’s leaders easily planted the seeds of Salafi Jihadism ideology into all cadres’ mind. 
Supported financially by a wealthy Saudi Arabian, Osama  Bin Laden, JI and its networking in 
South East Asia accordingly conducted their organization, recruitment, and operational tactic. 
 
6. Methods of Recruitment and Radicalization  
 
Initially, the DI recruits just like lay Muslim youth who interact with ordinary Muslim such as 
going to mosques and practices the ordinary Islamic rituals. After having contacted with JI activists 
and joined the training process, the DI activists disappeared without clear notice to his family. No 
body knows what they had actually been doing during their absence. This article calls this as the 
“missing period.” When the newly target went home after their missing, they showed strange 
behavior. They didn’t even interact with their neighbors, nor practiced ordinary Islamic rituals. 
This method of recruitment is different with that of Usrah in the third generation. 
It was most likely that they consider other lay Moslems inclusive of their former religious 
teacher as “infidel”. This stage has been clearly elaborated by former teacher of Hary Ghulon in 
the Metro Realita program and Ngruki graduates who are formerly classmates of Asmar Latinsani, 
Al Ghozi and Muchlas.  They even wonder how their classmates turn into terrorists, while they 
were still in Al Mukmin, Ngruki. With regard to the question how an individual becomes terrorist, 
the New York Police Department published a document in 2007, explaining the process and stages 
of individual radicalization, as follow: 
1. Pre-radicalization is a period when an individual undergoes his daily life before being 
radicalized.  
2. Self-identification is a phase when an individual slowly starts to secede himself from his old 
identity and associated himself with those who have been ideologically radicalized.  
3. Indoctrination is a stage when an individual intensifies and focuses on what he believes in 
radical ideology without questioning.   
4. Jihadization happens when an individual bases their action on their belief. He could conduct 
any violence as he motivated by narrow religious interpretation.  
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7. Eradicating Terrors: Some Action and Policy Options 
 
The efforts to fight against terrorism are now focused in the two concentrations. The first is 
enforcing policy that emphasizes on law enforcement and security measures. This strategy has been 
implemented consistently, by the governments in Southeast Asia region. Malaysia and Singapore 
even enforced Internal Security Acts (ISA) which give their security authority to detent a person 
without trial as a preventive measures. These policies have then been strengthened by improvement 
in the security policy such regional cooperation and institutional building capacity. Similarly, 
Indonesian government has improved their intelligence performance by building police academy 
and renovating the Densus 88/AT.  
However, these types of policy only touch the superficial problem. This is a repressive policy, 
which neither touches the core of problems nor even the roots of terrorism. The tribunal of terrorist 
even provide more popularity of terrorist since their arguments using Jihad is to fight against 
international injustice and bad government practices, is perceived as “make sense” to some lay 
Muslims. For the example, some pesantren students in Surakarta perceives the dead Al Ghozi who 
was sent and was buried in Solo, as a “hero” or “martyr” not as “a terrorist”. 
The second action being promoted is dialog, be it inter-civilizational dialog, intercultural dialog 
or inter-faith dialog. Such actions have successfully been done by moderate Islam organizations 
and Christian organization supported by international NGO. President SBY also has embarked the 
idea in the ASEM Summit. Usually such dialogs are taking place among the moderate groups 
across the believers who have been tolerant, pluralistic and moderate in nature. Very rare, the 
dialogs take place between the moderate and the militant groups. If there are, then the themes of 
dialog are those of the debatable, controversial and doctrinal topics, which lead to distance from 
consensus. In the context of eradicating terrorism, it is more likely that the dialogs just like giving 
medicine to healthy people, not to say “pouring salt in the ocean”. Although dialog is a democratic 
way in solving problems and important action to do, it is not specifically to respond the terrorism. 
From Moslem sides, the above forums were aimed at improving the image of Islam in the eyes 
of non-Moslems and international communities. It is believed that international community 
understands that any terrors conducted by any religion followers are nothing to do with religions 
as a system of faith. They are something to do with interpretation of religion cultivated or bred in 
bad international, national policy in economy-politic and social life. The motives to conduct 
terrorism are religiosity or religious understanding, but not religion. The majority of Indonesian 
Moslems just like Amrozi, Al Ghozi or Imam Samudra, but they don’t turn into a terrorist. The 
difference is that their interpretation of Islam is different from that of Amrozi, Al Ghozi and 
Samudra.  While the interpretation of the majority Muslims tends to the peaceful sides as relevant 
to the meaning of Islam itself, terrorist’ perception tend to the violent sides. The majority of the 
Indonesian Moslems grew up and has been socialized about Islamic teachings in different social 
setting from that of Amrozi and his militant fellows have. 
 
8. Winning the Heart and the Mind of Terrorists 
 
Taking from above analysis, this paper would propose an action so called Democratic straight 
forward strategy. Some experts call it as “Winning the heart and the mind” strategy. This concept 
consists of certain steps. From international dimension, all peace activists in the world should drive 
US and its allies to be more just and conduct balance policies to Moslem countries like that of in 
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Palestine, Iraq and Middle East. More concrete, the peace activists should enforce pressure to the 
US and its allies to reduce their unilateral and security approaches in the Moslem countries.  
From national level, the government or peace activists should start to approach the fourth and 
fifth generation of DI and draw line between those considered to be potential of becoming terrorist 
and those are not. At the same time, they should start to improve the quality of lives of their family 
and kids in term of employments, education or may suggest them to establish formal social 
organization or even political organization so as to officially channel their mission. Most of the 
family lives in poor economic, social and education especially those living in the village. They 
don’t have permanent jobs.  
At this stage dialog can be set up with the concrete themes, like improving the quality of 
education, eradicating corruption, poverty and so on by avoiding the sensitive themes such as 
secularism, liberalism which they perceive as the “infidel” vocabularies. Such dialog can build 
trust as the most important part in building social capital needed to promote democracy. Terrorists 
are human beings who are subject to change and transformation. After the dialog is successful, the 
effort can move on to the inner circle, that is the ex Afghan fighters or ex Moro fighter who are 
supported by militant elements of the fifth generation. However, one must be able to ensure them 
that they won’t be treated in security measures or sent to court. The program should provide them 
kind of social amnesty and accommodation, understand their past action, their grieves and improve 
their quality of life.   
 
9. Conclusion 
The violent movement in Indonesia using interpretation of Islamic teaching has its own roots in 
the history of the formation of the Indonesian state. As such, it is not just simply connected with JI 
operation. Within the regeneration of DI fighters, there was a strategy shift from using violence 
and military approaches to social and political movements that aimed at inserting Islamic law in 
the constitution. Moreover, there has been a strategy shift within DI from struggling to establish 
Islamic states to inserting Islamic shariah in the constitution.   
Obviously, there is no one prescription fits all in eradicating terrorism. So far like other South 
East Asian countries, Indonesia has conducted law enforcement, security measures, international 
agreement and intra-faith dialog to counter-terrorism. Yet terrorism remains existed. At least, we 
should try other alternative, if a medicine cannot cure the disease. And this requires all 
stakeholders, nationally and internationally, to improve a fair action to Moslems people, as well as 
upgrading their quality of life in education, social and economic. 
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